International Cooperative Housing by Schaeffer, Pamela
68
International 
Cooperative Housing
Pamela Schaeffer
Master of Urban Planning 2015
Master of Public Policy 2015
Lessons for the United States
Cooperative housing has proven to be a successful housing model, 
particularly in providing affordable housing, stabilizing and 
encouraging mixed-income communities, and serving as an ownership 
vehicle in markets that are underserved or lack mature financial 
infrastructure. Despite its positive record, the model has not been 
favored in the United States where individual ownership of property 
and subsidized affordable renting are the primary policy frameworks.  
This article describes the cooperative model and its benefits, followed 
by a description of Sukumar Granapati’s framework created in his 
analysis of cooperative housing models in Sweden, India and the United 
States. Studies of Australian and Canadian cooperative histories along 
with a breakout of the New York City market test the applicability of 
Granapati’s analysis to different markets.  Finally, I highlight common 
threads supporting successful cooperative housing markets.
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market, and what could be done to increase their 
presence? This paper describes the cooperative 
model and explores how different types of 
cooperatives provide affordable housing; 
provides a brief history of US cooperative 
housing and its place in national housing policy; 
and, lastly, uses a series of international case 
studies to pinpoint policies, public and private 
market supports, education and cooperative 
associations that may increase cooperative 
market share in the US.
Findings and Recommendations
Having a large, viable, and diverse cooperative 
market in the US will help connect supply 
and demand within the housing market. With 
sustained private and public investment, more 
housing options will serve more families and 
could provide greater stability to the whole 
housing market. For housing advocates trying to 
expand affordable housing availability through 
the use of housing cooperatives, this article 
highlights a need to build and balance public 
and private investment concurrently. There are 
three core actions that will help to create this 
policy/private-market balance. First, leverage 
policy at all levels. Changing federal priorities 
of existing programs and allowing cooperatives 
access to existing funding pathways is 
crucial. Additionally, strengthening or adding 
preferential tax and administrative support 
systems at the state and city level will allow for 
flexibility to meet local conditions. Second, build 
knowledge from within. Successful cooperative 
ownership occurs in a “cooperative culture” 
where members understand the benefits and 
responsibilities of joint property ownership 
and management. Growth of the sector will 
not occur without creating a base of ownership 
skills; a strong public and private knowledge and 
technical support system is needed to provide 
aid to individual communities. Third, be broad. 
Throughout these examples, the most stable 
cooperative environments are diverse, both 
in purpose and in structure. Market-rate and 
subsidized cooperatives should be encouraged 
to connect with each other and reach out to 
cooperative corporations outside of the housing 
market. This broad reach increases public 
awareness, creates networks of political allies, 
and insulates cooperative housing from shifts in 
government policy.
The Cooperative Model and 
Affordable Housing
History and Principles in Brief
The modern cooperative movement rose in 
Recovery efforts following the 2008 collapse of the housing market have focused on shoring up and restoring 
the home mortgage market.  Intense actions to 
remove bad assets, tighten credit, and untangle 
implicit public guarantees from the mortgage 
market are being pursued. Unfortunately, none 
of these reforms get to the root of why low- and 
middle-income families used sub-prime loans 
to enter the housing market. Prior to the housing 
collapse, low-interest rates and sub-prime loans 
were touted as “new financial tools” helping 
previously underserved households to build 
wealth through housing (Chomsisengphet and 
Pennington-Cross, 2006; Tishman, 2007). The 
current mortgage reforms may restore mortgage 
stability at the cost of returning these families 
to an underserved situation with even fewer 
choices. In order to serve these households, 
options need to be expanded, and one option 
that US housing policies and private markets 
have left underutilized is cooperative housing.
Cooperatives are a home-ownership vehicle 
widely used outside of the US and in a limited 
number of US cities and states. Studies of 
communities in Toronto, New York City, 
Washington DC, and Chicago have shown 
that the benefits of cooperatives include lower 
cost housing options, greater community 
involvement, longer tenure, flexibility in 
operations, finely grained household income 
mixes, and lower crime and vandalism rates 
(Cooper and Rodman, 2000; McStotts 2004; 
Miceli, Sazama and Sirmans, 1994; Saegert and 
Benitez, 2005). However, despite this list of 
benefits, cooperative housing makes up only 
1% of the total US housing market, focused 
in New York City and small areas in New 
England, Washington DC, southeast Michigan, 
Chicago, Wisconsin, and Southern California. 
This percentage pales in comparison to global 
numbers that include 17% in Sweden, 15%-10% 
across Europe, and 11% in India (Ganapati, 2010; 
ICA 2012).
Research Framework
This paper started as an effort to understand 
how cooperatives withstood the 2008 
foreclosure crisis.  The goal was to see if 
cooperatives provided more stable housing 
options for households than the home 
mortgages that were at the center of the crisis. 
It quickly became clear that the limited size of 
the US cooperative market translates to limited 
data: data that is often part of small, localized 
studies, spread over a wide time frame, and 
difficult to compare. The questions then became: 
why are cooperatives underutilized in the US 
70
Schaeffer
cooperative corporation, allowing them to 
reside on the property. There is usually blanket 
financing on the whole property, with a 
variety of possible individual fee structures for 
members.  Common areas and housing units 
alike are part of the cooperative holdings, and 
cooperative boards have a strong say in the sale 
and purchase of cooperative shares (National 
Cooperative Bank, n.d.). 
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Cooperation
The largest difference between cooperatives 
and condominiums is that most cooperatives 
follow the Rochdale Principles. In his history 
of social clubs in New York City Joshua 
Freeman points out that many of the 1920s 
New York City cooperatives were founded 
as social, political, and cultural communities 
with common facilities including libraries, club 
rooms, and dining rooms, which provide greater 
opportunities for member interaction (Freeman, 
2002). While the majority of cooperatives are no 
longer united by union membership, trade, or 
political philosophies, the sense of belonging is 
important for members. Many of the benefits of 
successful cooperative communities stem from 
the common ownership and consensus-based 
governance they require.
This type of ownership can also cause 
problems.  Studies in Canada show that tenure 
rates fall when cooperative boards cannot 
choose members willing to invest time in 
the community (Cooper and Rodman, 2000).  
Further, cooperatives require members to 
have basic knowledge about the physical and 
financial needs of property maintenance, 
and an understanding of consensus building.  
Successful markets have robust public, private, 
or community organizations that provide 
training, advice, or maintenance services.  In 
turn, isolated and “untrained” cooperatives are 
threatened by collapse, as seen in a study in 
Washington, DC where the difference between 
success and failure was often traced to a lack of 
financial and property management knowledge 
in the membership (Coalition for Nonprofit 
Housing and Economic Development, 2004).
Cooperative Types and Affordable Housing
There are two primary forms of housing 
cooperative: one based in common property 
ownership, and the other based in finance 
and development, providing members with 
mortgages and/or construction services. The 
type of cooperative operating in a market is a 
response to local gaps in financial and housing 
services. In areas with scarce physical housing, 
response to the displacement and changing 
labor conditions of industrialization in Europe.  
In 1844 a group of weavers in Rochdale, England 
pooled resources to purchase basic goods in 
bulk; they then sold those goods to members 
at low prices. Eventually membership in the 
Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society was open 
to all with payment of membership fees. The 
society established a community doctrine, 
The Rochdale Principles, which still serves 
as the foundation of the modern cooperative 
community (Table 1).
In the late 1800s the cooperative model was 
adapted to address the need for affordable 
and stable housing in growing industrial cities. 
The earliest developments were in Berlin, in 
Stockholm, and throughout England. They 
spread across Europe and remain particularly 
strong in Central Europe, Sweden, and Norway.  
Globally, the periods before the First World 
War, and between the First and the Second 
World War, saw consistent and stable growth 
(Ganapati, 2010; Sazama, 2000; Siegler and 
Levey, 1986). Continued industrialization and 
urbanization created housing shortages, and 
cooperative housing societies filled the void 
between need and available financing (Abbot 
and Doucouliagos, 2007; Ganapati, 2001).
Cooperatives and Condominiums
From the mid-1800s through the 1960s, the 
two primary modes of multi-family residence 
were membership in a housing cooperative, 
which allowed an ownership stake, and renting. 
Condominiums entered the market in the 
1960s when they were legally enabled in the US 
(Bennett, 2011; Siegler and Levey, 1986). They 
are now the dominant form of multi-family 
ownership in the US and provide a contrast to 
cooperatives.  Basically, condominium units 
are individually owned and purchased with 
personal mortgages.  Owners hold common 
areas jointly but otherwise have little control 
over the property, including little say in the 
selling and purchasing of units.  Conversely, 
cooperative members own a share of a 
Fig. 6.1 ICA Cooperative Identity, 
Values, and Principles
source: ica.coop/en
Definition of a Cooperative Principles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Voluntary and Open Membership
Democratic Member Control
Member Economic Participation
Autonomy and Independence
Education, Training, and Information
Cooperation among Cooperative
Concern for Community
A cooperative is an autonomous 
association of person united 
voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural 
needs and aspirations through 
jointly owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise.
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1995; Sazma, 2000). Current housing policy 
focuses on single-family home-ownership 
through the income tax deduction of mortgage 
interest and subsidized rental for the lowest 
income families. Policy favors single-family 
home-ownership: the tax deduction costs the 
federal government $70 billion in lost revenue 
versus the $17 billion directly spent on rental 
subsidies (Fischer and Huang, 2013; HUD 2014). 
Neither of these options helps working families 
whose income is too high for subsidized help 
and not high enough to qualify in the re-
tightened mortgage market.
US Cooperative Development and Policy
The first cooperative housing in the US was 
built in New York City in 1875. Early ventures 
provided an ownership option for middle and 
upper class New York City residents (Siegler 
and Levey, 1986). The use of cooperatives for 
affordable housing began in 1918 when a group 
of Finnish artisans started the Finnish Home 
Building Association in Brooklyn, New York. 
There was no national legislation encouraging 
or discouraging cooperative development 
from 1920 to 1950. Attempts to include them 
in both the 1937 and 1948 National Housing 
Acts were made but in both cases real estate 
and home building interests joined with 
conservative politicians to defeat the efforts 
(Sazama, 2000).  Some progress was made in 
1950 with the addition of Section 213 to the 
National Housing Act. Section 213, which is still 
in effect, extends FHA loan guarantees to new 
housing cooperatives. In 1959 rehabilitation and 
extension loans for existing cooperatives were 
added to FHA’s scope. However, the perceived 
leftist leanings of unions and housing advocates 
cooperatives form to build housing, and in 
areas where the mortgage market is immature, 
cooperatives form to provide financing. Table 2 
outlines general cooperative types and the case-
study regions where they are dominant.
Nothing in the character of cooperatives makes 
them specifically affordable housing models; 
however, cooperatives fill the gaps between 
need and conventional housing/finance and 
therefore have developed in ways that create 
affordable housing. Finance cooperatives 
provide home and construction financing 
to underserved populations and often serve 
working-class households. The cooperative 
pools the risk and provides a buffer between 
private banks and households. If the cooperative 
secures publically subsidized as well as private 
loans, it can offer financing to members at 
affordable rates. Australia made use of financial 
cooperatives before the home mortgage market 
was mature, and India still uses them to mediate 
between large banks and local needs (Abbott 
and Doucouliagos, 2007; Ganapati, 2001).
Limiting equity accumulation creates 
affordability in property-based models.  Tenure 
cooperatives accumulate equity with property 
value, and the value of member shares reflects 
this equity. Prices in private cooperatives mirror 
general housing values, and members may 
require private financing, similar to a mortgage, 
just to purchase a share. Affordability is 
introduced when equity is limited or eliminated, 
as in the limited-equity cooperative (LEC) 
and the non-equity or rental cooperative. In 
each buy-in, costs and fees are kept low since 
property value is not being bought and sold. 
LECs allow for a controlled equity accumulation, 
usually calculated based on tenure and fee 
structure. This encourages longer tenure 
and creates an opportunity for some wealth 
accumulation. Non-equity developments offer 
no wealth benefits but differ from subsidized 
rental housing in their adherence to the 
Rochdale Principles and the control residents 
have over membership and management. A 
mixture of tenure cooperatives makes up the 
bulk of the Swedish, Canadian, and US markets.
US Housing Policies
Despite its positive record, the cooperative 
model is not favored in the United States. 
The lack of support stems from the 
complicated political balance between liberal 
and conservative thought about the role of 
government in the housing market and political 
suspicion of cooperative ownership versus 
individual participation in the market (Hays, 
Fig. 6.2. Housing cooperative types 
and location examples. 
source: Ganapti (2010) 
* - denotes addition to table by author
Type Characteristics Location*
Cooperative owns housing development; 
members own equity share
India 
Sweden 
United States
Cooperative owns housing development; 
members own share with limits on equity 
accumulation.
Sweden 
United States
Cooperative owns housing development; 
members pay rent to coop regularly 
without equity accumulation.
Sweden
Canada
Cooperative provides loans to members 
for building construction or repairs.
Australia
India
Cooperative undertakes building 
construction and/or develops land on 
behalf of members
India 
Sweden
Tenure Cooperative
Limited-equity 
tenure cooperative*
Rental cooperative 
similar-to: Non-
equity cooperative*
Finance cooperative
Building cooperative
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itself of public housing developments; for 
some properties cooperative conversion was 
used. While this marked a public retreat from 
affordable housing provision, it increased the 
number of LECs in the market and allowed 
many, although not all, residents to stay in 
their homes and gain an ownership stake. As 
part of the conversions the federal government 
provided funds for rehabilitating properties, and 
the continued success of the cooperatives often 
depends on their having taken advantage of this 
inexpensive rehabilitation (CNHED, 2004).
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, 
affordable cooperative housing development has 
suffered the same fate as all publicly subsidized 
housing. The 1986 tax reforms that ushered in 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
have been the main vehicle for low-income 
housing development in the United States, but 
the credits are not available to cooperatives. 
Community sponsors have worked with the 
LIHTC requirements by establishing “lease-
hold” cooperatives that function as non-equity 
or LEC communities. But this is a work-
around rather than a demonstration of federal 
support. During the last two decades, affordable 
cooperative development has survived on 
piecemeal assembly of LIHTC and Community 
Reinvestment funds, and the limited resources 
available through the National Cooperative Bank 
and union pension investment (Sazama, 2000).
Coupled with weak and inconsistent public 
support for cooperative housing is the lack of a 
strong and independent support service sector. 
In the US market there are organizations like 
the National Cooperative Bank, the National 
Association of Cooperative Housing, the 
National Cooperative Business Association, and 
local associations; however, these organizations 
are not as well-funded, present, or active as 
those in more robust cooperative environments 
(Sazama, 2000; Siegler and Levey, 1986). The call 
for organizations capable of providing training, 
administrative support, financial advice and 
physical maintenance timelines is a constant 
within the cooperative and CDC community 
(CMHN, 2004; CNHED, 2004; Enterprise 
Foundation, 2003; Ganapati, 2001; Miceli, 
Sazama and Sirmans. 1994; Saegert and Benitez, 
2005).
Cooperative Housing Development 
and Government Policies
Many studies of cooperative housing are 
focused on single case studies. However, it is 
possible to draw common lessons. Sukumar 
Ganapati did this in his 2010 article on Sweden, 
in the 1960s and the single-family priorities of 
the post-war era have kept Section 213 from 
being fully funded (Sazama, 2000).
Despite anemic policy support, cooperatives 
continued to be established; during the inter-war 
and immediate post-WWII era, unions and 
labor groups successfully sponsored private 
developments in Detroit, Buffalo, Philadelphia, 
Chicago, San Francisco, and especially New 
York City (Siegler and Levey, 1986). Another 
addition to the cooperative stock came 
immediately after WWII when the federal 
government disposed of war production worker 
housing. Searching for a way to meet the needs 
of returning veterans, cooperatives were allowed 
to purchase these properties with subsidized 
loans if the community included veterans 
(Sazama, 2000).
The most sustained federal support came 
in 1961 with the Below Market Interest Rate 
(BMIR) program. Under BMIR, cooperatives 
serving low-income families had access to 40-
year low-interest federal loans. Cooperatives 
could use these loans to cover construction 
and rehabilitation costs when they promised 
to limit equity accumulation and set new 
member income guidelines for the life of the 
loan (Sazama, 2000). This program is the basis 
for many of the LEC developments that are still 
found in the United States. The BMIR programs 
were repealed with the 1974 Housing Act when 
federal policy shifted toward rental vouchers.
Condominiums, the largest competitor 
for middle-income, private multi-family 
development, entered the market in the 1960s. 
Over time, banks, realtors and the market have 
shown a strong preference for condominiums. 
For bankers they offer a defined commodity 
and risk, loans are smaller and foreclosures 
on defaults are easier to pursue. Realtors can 
collect larger fees and provide greater services 
on the property transfers of condominiums. 
And lastly, owners can purchase and sell units 
without a cooperative board’s involvement in 
the transaction. This collection of differences 
has pushed the market toward condominium 
development. As of 2007, only 10% of the multi-
ownership properties erected in the US were 
cooperatives (Schill, Voicu, and Miller, 2007).
The last federally supported creation of 
cooperative housing occurred under the HUD 
HOPE programs. However, rather than an 
encouragement of new affordable housing, 
these programs can be characterized as public 
housing “load-shedding” (McStotts, 2004). In 
1980 the federal government began divesting 
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Fig. 6.3. Cooperative-State 
Relations. 
source: Ganapti (2010) 
* - denotes addition to table by author
Relationship Comments*State
Registrar controls operations at the 
state level, imposing administrative and 
objective goals on local cooperatives.
National government support, especially 
under Nehru, imprinted political goals 
and strategies on cooperatives.
With direct oversight growing and the 
control of resident pools Canadian 
cooperatives are losing independence, 
and becoming more tied to provincial 
government.
India
Mumbai transition-
ing to embedded 
autonomy*
Canada*
transition in: 1990’s
Overembeddedness
Intimate ties with 
the state, generally 
accompanied by a 
loss of cooperative 
independence
Embedded 
Autonomy
Balance between 
ties with the state 
and cooperative 
autonomy
Disembeddedness
Few or no ties to the 
state but marked 
by high degree 
of cooperative 
independence
Australia*
transition in: 1990’s
Sweden
NYC*
Majority funding from government 
sources forcing private cooperatives to 
follow state objectives
The dependence on state financing 
and inflexible service targets made the 
cooperative obsolete and led to demise.
Strong national cooperatives with 
complementary, but independent 
relationship to state.
Cooperatives have highly evolved 
internal support.
Strong cooperative culture with 
government support and private 
investment.
Cooperatives serving variety of 
populations.
Relied on middle and lower class 
clientele with funding sources from 
private and public institutions. The mix 
allowed building socieities serve 40% of 
home building.
Weak support of cooperative financing, 
usually considered as disinvestment 
method from public housing programs.
Lack of state policy handicaps private 
cooperative operations and finance
Canada
transitioning out: 
1960s
Australia
transition out: 
1960’s
US
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India and the United States. Borrowing from 
Peter Evans’ work on state-industrial relations, 
Ganapati classifies cooperative public policy in 
three categories: overembeddedness, embedded 
autonomy, and disembeddedness.  Intimate, 
balanced, and weak ties between the state and 
cooperatives mark each level of embeddedness 
and reflect the cooperatives’ degree of 
independence from regulatory interference. As 
described, the US cooperative environment, 
with the exception of New York City, exemplifies 
a disembedded cooperative market, where 
weak public support is coupled with weak 
private cooperative development. A summary of 
“embeddedness” categories and the regions and 
time periods in which they are seen is provided 
in Table 3. The analysis of cooperative-state 
relations holds for all types of developments: 
non-equity, market rate, property, financial, and 
any mix of them all.
Embedded autonomous cooperative-state 
relations are characterized by balanced public 
and private investments; the state supports 
cooperative development but allows individual 
cooperatives freedom to govern themselves. 
Ganapati holds Sweden up as the clearest 
example of embedded autonomy; however, 
there are pitfalls in replicating the Swedish 
model in the United States. Sweden is a 
small nation; with an area slightly larger than 
California and population similar to New 
York City, Sweden is comparable to state and 
province service areas.  Further, the population 
of Sweden is relatively homogeneous, a 
characteristic that can be important in 
cooperative living and self-governance. Finally, 
Sweden’s cooperatives operated in a legally 
protected environment up until 2009; it is 
unlikely that any jurisdiction in the United 
States could provide such strong protection to 
cooperative development. Sweden’s model of 
publically enabled private cooperative housing 
is very successful, but bringing it to scale has 
proven difficult; advocates need to look for 
parallels and lessons there and in other models 
operating that are informative for the complex 
federal-state, public-private structure of the US 
market. 
Sweden
Swedish housing policy uses cooperative 
housing in support of a national objective 
that regards shelter as a basic right.  Tenure 
cooperatives are the primary operators in the 
Swedish market. As Table 2 shows, however, 
a variety of cooperative types have existed 
in Sweden.  The building societies have 
remained independent of the government, but 
the government has given them preferential 
treatment and leveraged their capacities to 
provide public housing (Ganapati, 2010).  There 
is a mixture of small and large players in the 
Swedish market, but it is dominated by large 
building cooperatives that finance and construct 
housing for a national membership base. When 
a building is complete, it is turned over to a 
tenant cooperative that remains tied to the 
support structure of the national organization. 
Within this set-up the tenant cooperatives have 
the flexibility to individually run buildings, while 
the national organization provides training and 
administrative support (Siegler and Levey, 1986).
The first of Sweden’s cooperative societies, 
SKB, was formed in 1916 and specialized 
in rental cooperatives. However, 1921 and 
1923 saw the creation of SCB and HSB, two 
tenure cooperatives. Since the early 1930’s the 
relationship between the cooperative housing 
societies and the government has been one of 
mutual support.  During the inter-war period 
leaders of the national cooperatives sat on 
the government’s Social Housing Committee; 
in turn the cooperatives steered building 
growth, service, and housing type in support 
of governmental policy (Ganapati, 2010). 
When the government created Municipal 
Housing Commissions to administer public 
housing, they turned to the cooperatives for 
development and administrative capacity; 
though even in this relationship, national and 
individual cooperatives were able to maintain 
their independence (Ganapati, 2010).  In this 
way private and subsidized cooperatives were 
woven throughout the market that served high-, 
middle- and low-income households.
In 2009 the Swedish government legalized 
condominiums and official protection of 
the cooperative market ended; however, 
cooperatives still command a 50% share of the 
home-ownership market (Pittini and Laino, 
2011).
New York City
Similar to Sweden, New York City’s multi-
family housing tradition is rooted in diverse 
cooperative developments, with supportive 
state and local regulations. In 2007 cooperatives 
provided more than 80% of multi-family 
housing in New York City (Schill, Voicu, and 
Miller, 2007). The size and growth of the city 
before the legalization of condominiums meant 
that private cooperatives met the multi-
family ownership demands unmet by the 
rental market. However, unlike in many other 
American cities, there is also public support for 
affordable cooperative options. New York State’s 
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“Mitchell-Lama” Act provides tax concessions 
and low-interest, state-bond backed loans to 
cooperatives that restrict equity accumulation 
for the life of the loans. Additional affordability 
protections are provided through city laws 
sheltering residents in LEC’s that are at the end 
of the Mitchell-Lama loan period. Within the 
NYC market, affordable cooperatives are often 
used to combat gentrification and the rising 
costs of housing. However, the city also turned 
to them to counter federal disinvestment and 
property abandonment. In the 1970s the city 
started a program supporting cooperative self-
management efforts by tenants in underfunded 
public housing and abandoned apartment 
houses by providing administrative and 
financial education (Leavitt and Saegert, 2007). 
Upon completion of the program, members of 
the cooperatives had access to subsidized loans 
for property purchase and rehabilitation, and 
commenced operations with trained boards and 
buildings in good repair (CMHN, 2004).
Overembeddedness and Disembeddedness
In Ganapati’s framework, over and under 
involvement by the state are destructive to 
cooperative stability. The US framework 
shows how weak public policy translates to 
weak cooperative markets. However, equally 
damaging is an overly involved government 
policy that sets priorities from the top down.
India
India’s cooperative housing roots lay in 
colonization and the cooperative movements 
taking place in Great Britain. In 1912 the 
colonial government enabled the first housing 
cooperatives, beginning a cooperative culture 
that underpins current developments. The 
types of cooperatives developed in India vary 
from province to province, filling voids in bank 
financing by providing credit, bureaucratic, and 
construction support. As of 2010, cooperatives in 
India served 11% of the market, which constitutes 
over 2 million households (Ganapati, 2010).
India’s Registrar of Cooperative Societies is 
the national-level authority that enables states 
to conduct the oversight and regulation of 
cooperatives. Prior to independence, oversight 
was active but did not compromise cooperative 
operations. However, with Indian independence 
in 1947, the Registrars were enhanced. 
Emphasizing cooperative action as a state value, 
cooperatives became tools of government policy 
and national finance and support structures 
were put in place – a mixed blessing to the 
cooperatives (Ganapati, 2010). In some states 
this close relationship is a wedge between 
public action, private investment, and general 
need. Mumbai has the most active housing 
cooperatives and the least intrusive Registrar.  
In Mumbai private cooperative success with 
middle and low income earners proved to be 
a useful model for local public agencies who 
adapted it to organize slum dwellers into service, 
credit, and housing groups.  The Bombay 
Registrar has maintained a strictly supportive 
role, allowing both the private and public 
cooperatives to define and tailor programs 
to meet the needs of their target members 
(Ganapati, 2001).  With this success, the Indian 
government has attempted to bring these 
lessons to scale through the Registrar offices in 
other states; however, it has not achieved the 
same participation through top-down mandates.
Australia
Starting in the 1840s private building societies 
existed in New South Wales (NSW); however, 
many were marked by mismanagement and 
failure. In response to a growing need for 
housing and a lack of bank financing, the 
state created financial housing cooperatives 
under the 1936 Housing Improvement Act. To 
counter previous experiences, state oversight 
was enhanced and a mixed public-private 
funding mechanism was introduced. The 
cooperatives secured blanket loans from banks 
and the government and then lent these funds 
to members for construction of homes; in turn 
members paid share fees to the cooperative. All 
cooperatives were registered with the Registrar 
of Cooperative Housing Societies, which 
inspected accounts and assessed homes. Once 
a cooperative’s loans were paid in full, it ceased 
to exist; it had served its purpose of mediating 
between funders and homeowners. 
Obtaining funds from private banks allowed 
the cooperatives to maintain independent 
operations under the oversight of the Registrar, 
and the cooperatives provided financing for 
40% of the NSW homes built in 1960 (Abbott 
and Doucouliagos, 2007). However, in the 
1960s banks began to enter the mortgage 
market, and funding for cooperatives shifted 
almost exclusively to the government. At this 
point the cooperatives became tools of targeted 
government housing policy (Abbott and 
Doucouliagos, 1999). This relationship persisted 
until 1993 when the Registrars were abolished and 
the private cooperatives lost their institutional 
support. However, the decline of the cooperatives 
actually started in the 1970s when majority 
government funding and targeted public policy 
goals stripped the societies of their independence.
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Common threads for success
The primary lesson for US cooperative 
development is that public and private 
investment must be made in a balanced and 
mutually reinforcing manner (Ganapati, 2010). 
With that framework, national and local 
policy changes must be sought, private and 
institutional support structures are required, and 
economic, political and cultural alliances need 
to be fostered.
Policy and Implementation
US cooperative housing advocates must 
push cooperative-state relations from the 
disembedded state to embedded autonomy. 
In the US this means a shift in priorities at the 
national level. The current political atmosphere 
of sequestration, low-level austerity and tax 
reform leaves little maneuvering room for 
cooperative advocates. However, there are 
programs in place that should be leveraged 
for cooperative use. Section 213, the FHA 
administered mortgage program, needs to be 
funded to its full potential, and cooperatives 
need access to LIHTC funds to begin a market 
transformation. Access to LIHTC funds in 
particular is important for existing and forming 
cooperatives; it makes funds more freely 
available, increases exposure of private markets 
to cooperative structures, and creates the 
mixed private-public financing of independent 
cooperatives that has proven successful in many 
environments.
On the state and local levels, the success of the 
New York City experience is useful. The New 
York state Mitchell-Lama Laws and New York 
City affordable protections are proven models of 
cooperative encouragement. However, perhaps 
even more important is the program used by the 
city to convert public housing and abandoned 
private properties to tenant-controlled 
cooperatives. This program allowed the local 
housing community flexibility in private 
and public housing situations, and created a 
framework for provision of training and support 
services.
Once a shift in policy takes place, it is important 
that cooperative communities guard against 
too large a shift.  As seen in the Australian and 
Canadian examples, the move away from a 
balanced relationship can damage and even 
destroy established and successful cooperative 
institutions.  In order to safeguard an embedded 
autonomous relationship, knowledgeable and 
diverse cooperative environments are required.
Canada
Canada has made use of cooperatives in the 
provision of public housing, where national, 
provincial and local governments favor non-
equity communities. This approach has proven 
successful in serving low-wage professionals 
and the working poor, especially in Ontario 
where 48% of this housing exists (Sousa and 
Quarter, 2003).
Canada’s non-equity cooperatives were 
established in the 1973 National Housing Act, 
which introduced a tiered public housing 
program. Within this framework the Canadian 
national government entered into agreements 
with existing cooperative sponsors and non-
profit organizations to set up mixed-income 
communities. In Ontario, the cooperatives 
were required to provide space for low-
income households in exchange for low-rate 
direct loans from the national, provincial, and 
municipal governments. While the members 
of these cooperatives did not earn equity, they 
did enjoy the other benefits of cooperatives 
including democratic control, self-management, 
membership approval and secure tenure (Sousa 
and Quarter, 2003). In order to maintain the 
low- and moderate-income focus of these 
cooperatives, they received government support 
through tenant subsidies. The cooperatives 
were free to decide how and in what proportion 
these subsidies would be applied to households 
(Cooper and Rodman, 2000; Sousa and Quarter, 
2003).
The structure of the cooperative-state 
relationship changed in 1993 when the 
national government stopped direct financing 
and pushed public housing responsibility to 
provincial governments. In Ontario, where 
most of the non-equity housing is located, the 
provincial government pushed responsibility 
to the municipal level in 2000. The most 
drastic changes for the cooperatives were 
the loss of membership approval and control 
over government subsidies. The changes in 
subsidy allotments motivated some long-time 
members to leave, and the need to fill the 
vacancies quickly curtailed the cooperative 
board interview process. This creates a situation 
where new residents are not always suited 
to participatory cooperative living. These 
changes, coupled with new and more stringent 
administrative systems and central management 
of some services, are affecting cooperative 
dynamics. While the non-equity cooperatives 
are not likely to disappear, some individual 
communities will likely fail (Cooper and 
Rodman, 2000).
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Support structures and knowledge bases
The lack of familiarity with cooperative housing 
is one of the largest obstacles to growing the 
market in the US. Growing the knowledge base 
is key to growing the private side of the public-
private balance needed. The steps required are 
two-fold: public outreach to foster a “cooperative 
culture,” and internal technical education to 
build competent cooperative management. 
Existing national organizations are suited to the 
public outreach element. These groups need to 
make a concerted effort to collect data and reach 
out to private finance interests, community 
organizations, public housing authorities, and 
existing cooperative associations with access to 
that information. 
A larger effort needs to be made to increase the 
proficiency of cooperative boards in managing 
properties. The local nature of this effort, 
coupled with the general need, means that it 
has to be engaged at all levels and by public 
and private concerns. Options for this effort 
include building private capacity in property 
management and development companies, 
earmarking state funding for training, engaging 
public housing authorities in both training and 
facilitation within individual cooperatives, and 
increasing the capacity of existing national and 
regional cooperative associations.
Diversity and Independence
Diversity within the cooperative environment 
will provide multiple benefits. First and 
foremost, it insulates communities from 
changes in government policy. The Australian 
and Canadian experiences show how narrow 
cooperative structures are vulnerable to shifts 
in government policy, and the Indian example 
highlights the failings of a narrow government 
focus in fostering cooperatives. Second, a 
variety of cooperative structures will more 
closely reflect the variety of housing needs in 
regional and local areas. In turn the variety 
of housing needs demands that cooperatives 
resist being labeled in one way. For example, 
US trends currently favor LECs for their 
affordability. However, LECs also promote 
economic development, provide a stop against 
gentrification and displacement, and build 
community participation rates (McStotts, 2004; 
Saegert, Eizenberg, Extein, Hsieh, Benitez and 
Chang 2002). Each of these benefits makes 
funding and support of LECs attractive beyond 
the affordable housing arguments.
The diversity of cooperatives in Sweden and 
New York City enhances their influence on 
policy and exposes the public to their function. 
In the larger US market, where the scale of 
the cooperative housing market limits the 
possibilities and reach of associations, reaching 
out to allies in retail, agriculture, utility and 
other cooperative markets will help housing 
advocates increase political influence and public 
familiarity.
Conclusion
While it is unlikely that the US will ever embrace 
cooperative ownership to the degree of Sweden, 
it is possible to develop a stronger “third way” 
model. A concerted effort by advocates should 
begin with leveraging existing government 
programs, building a comprehensive 
understanding of cooperative housing, and 
making alliances across public and private 
cooperatives of all types. Doing these things 
concurrently will begin the process of building 
private and public investment. This investment 
will create experiences that can provide answers 
to questions surrounding housing access and 
stability in the housing market.
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